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Critical Notices
Moira McConnell* Corpor- (r)eality
[Review of Alan Hyde, Bodies of Law, (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton
University Press, 1997)]
"Don't judge a book by its cover" is a maxim most frequently recited to
children by adults to explain the idea that one should not judge people on
the basis of appearance. This maxim captures the gist of the topic
explored in Alan Hyde's Bodies of Law. Bodies of Law seeks to expose
the fact that we simultaneously view a person as an entity distinct from
her or his physical manifestation while our understanding and response
to a person is affected by our perceptions and judgments regarding their
physical characteristics.
The relationship between a book and its cover is also relevant in a more
literal sense to Bodies of Law. With the advent of computerized publish-
ing techniques, book covers, unlike people, are not plagued with many
immutable characteristics. One can, in fact, judge a book to some degree
by its cover. It is fair to assume that an author, in collaboration with the
publisher's marketing division, has had some say about the shape, size,
cover, font, etc. of her or his book. In commenting on a book, particularly
one expressly employing a "deconstructive" and interdisciplinary meth-
odology including semiotics, it is important to pay serious attention to the
cover and other subliminal expressions of the author's view. Adopting
the author's argument, then, I will comment on both the cover and the
content of Bodies of Law. This approach resonates with legal experience
since the distinction between procedure and substance is often illusory in
determining outcomes. This is the case with Bodies of Law.
The Form/Cover
Bodies of Law is a 294-page, larger than average size paperback with a
glossy graphic cover. It is reminiscent of the high-end "gothic horror"
genre with its visual invocation of the shadowy world of the macabre.
Five computer-enhanced photo images of body parts, two of genitals,
another a woman's breasts, the fourth a raised muscular arm and hand,
and the fifth a side view of what appear to be male haunches and feet
* Dalhousie Law School.
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crossed with a bleeding slice on the thigh- presumably some reference
to penitence-float in ghastly shades of yellow and greys on a backdrop
of black and blood-red. A shadowed text declaims the title and author. At
a minimum, it looks like it might be a "good read" as law books go, a
dramatic, provocative, perhaps even humorous, book. Even the author's
name suggests a pun. Unfortunately, and contrary to my comments
above, Bodies of Law proves the veracity of the saying about books and
covers. But, to give the author the benefit of doubt, perhaps that was his
specific intent.
On other matters of form, perhaps more in the order of procedure, the
author, a professor at Rutgers University and a self-described member of
the Critical Legal Studies networks (a "Crit") expressly claims that he is
making an attempt to avoid what he sees to be the evils of current CLS
writing. He tells us he wants to produce a book free of the "obscurity,
pomposity and disregard of standards of logic and argumentation,"' and
the over-citation, fine-print referencing and claiming of authority that is
often associated with CLS writing. He plans to avoid these ills through a
"methodologically light" deconstructive case law reading and promises
not to indulge in endless discussions of deconstruction per se.2
The pace and style of Bodies of Law is obviously intended to emulate
the energy of an oral presentation, including colloquialisms ("gosh") and
somewhat obscure snide asides.3 It reads somewhat like a verbatim
transcript of his lectures to a seminar on The Legal History of the Body
at Yale4 with very little editorial intervention aside from numerous, albeit
short, footnotes. It may have been preferable to simply present these ideas
as a series of lectures on the various points rather then attempting to string
them together to reflect an overarching thesis and conclusion.
Alan Hyde tells us that his own reading and approach is deliberately
"eclectic" in that he draws on diverse sources, some known, some
unknown (at least to "crits"). He presents a long list of what he has not
done in his research, presumably to forestall criticism on these grounds
and to establish that his approach is based on a determined theoretical
stance rather ignorance of the norms of scholarship in his field.
Despite his stated intentions, the author breaks his promise about
jargon. He has an irritating and seemingly overwhelming affection for the
word "discourse" in all its conjugations, so much so that not only is it
repeated numerous times on most pages but also appears on occasion
1. at vii.
2. at vii, viii.
3. at xi,67.
4. at x. In fact numerous seminars and people are thanked for their input and response.
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more than once in a single sentence. Thus the book is not about human
bodies, it is about "discursive bodies." Obviously this is done to make the
point that the bodies dealt with by the law are creations of the law and are
not necessarily real. The same can be said of any disciplinary approach
to the body, such as medicine, sociology or psychology. But its use is
overdone. Not only is it tiresome, this language serves to obscure rather
than clarify his ideas. For example, discourse is a word used, mostly by
academics, to refer to the communication of ideas, usually by talking. The
word discursive is often used to describe a discussion that is rambling. It
is also used to describe a system of logical reasoning in philosophy. In
experimental science it is used to refer to the notion of "straight line" or
linear thinking and arrangement of information.5 In this sense, law can be
seen as a reflecting a linear form of reasoning in that is based on a system
of collection of information which is arranged in a specific sequence to
lead to a logical conclusion, which is not necessarily tied to any reality.
It not clear how the ideas imported by using this language fit into Alan
Hyde's overall argument, which is, for the most part, directed at illustrat-
ing in formal terms the illogic of the way human bodies are dealt with in
legal cases.
For a book that professes a commitment to creating a dialogue between
crits and non-crits, the jargon is still frequently exclusive and impen-
etrable: i.e., "antinecessitarian project." The net result of this combina-
tion of "folksiness" and "exclusivity" is uncomfortable: it is all a bit
contrived and neither approach works well.
Between the Covers
As Alan Hyde remarks regarding the value of his book, "The proof of the
pudding is in the reading." 6 Moving beyond appearances then, is there
anything nourishing or even edible in Bodies of Law? Does the reader
walk away with some new insight? My conclusion, after devoting a great
deal of time to reading and digesting each part of this book, is that the
results did not, on balance, justify the energy involved in consumption.
Bodies of Law seeks to debunk the notion that there is any valid
distinction to be drawn between personhood and physical being by
examining this idea as it presents itself in American law developed by
American lawyers (it is an unabashedly culturally specific "USA centric"
5. R. Hobson, Forms of Feeling: The Heart of Psychotherapy ( London: Tavistock Publica-
tions, 1985) at 65.
6. at. viii.
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book). Other ways of describing this issue are well known, ranging from
religious debates regarding the relationship between body and soul to the
more contemporary language of "mind/body split." He goes further than
simply pointing this out and examines the ways in which the physical
presentation and representation of ourselves is unavoidably an aspect of
how we understand our own and others' personhood: despite the admo-
nitions of childhood, we do in fact judge books and people by their
''covers."
Alan Hyde's approach involves exposing the absurdity of the law's
maintenance of this distinction by demolishing (deconstructing) any
"real" or stable view of the body in law. He seems to being doing this in
order to eliminate one half of the body/person equation. The result, in
theory, should be the emergence of a more organic view of a human, e.g.,
a hand is not a hand unattached to a person, a hand is a part of a person
and legal decisions relating to its value, liberty and regulation are
decisions about the person.
In exploring these ideas Hyde's work is essentially that of a linguist
since he is not examining bodies, he is only examining the words that we
use to describe people, things and ideas. He does not expressly position
his analysis in this field7 but, in passing, notes the extent to which our
body parts and functions dominate language, i.e., "face saving," "to lose
face," "the head (of an institution)," "gut feeling," "the heart of the
matter," "a breath of air".
The author has three aspirations for Bodies of Law:
1. "[It] collects, classifies and analyzes the way American lawyers talk
about the body: the range of metaphors, similes, and other verbal
constructions that cumulatively form a discourse of the body."8 In
examining the discussion among members of this group, classified by
citizenship and job, he considers when the body is property; when it is
landscape; when it is a common experience; when it is a site of difference;
when it is controlled; and when it controls. Bodies of Law is intended to
be a catalogue of this discussion.
2. "[T]o advance the project of applying recent critical theory to legal
analysis, to open up a dialogue between a legal academy that is often
dissatisfied with the ineffective and repetitive quality of its internal
discourse, and a world of critical theory .... ." In effect Bodies of Law
attempts to both cross and connect disciplines in academia.
7. He might agree to placement in the field of semiotics in that he does see the body asin part,




3. " [T]his book aspires to be a major jurisprudential statement from the
Critical Legal Studies networks. I will be emphasizing that multiple
competing constructions of the body are available to legal and to other
speakers; that these are constructions; neither natural nor limited by
biology. . . . This book carries the critical legal studies project of
denaturalization to its core .... If I can show that the body, too, is a
discursive creation, the antinecessitarian project of critical legal studies
will have been carried to its ultimate destination."' 10
He goes on to note his desire to move beyond deconstruction to
reconstruction and, finally, "toward a jurisprudence of human presence
.... " 11 "My goal," he states, "is not to replace any particular way of
talking about bodies, but, instead, to multiply the competing construc-
tions that are available to anyone, the better to force confrontation with
their provisional and artificial quality."'" This analytical approach and
messianic motive is hard to fault. It finds its predecessors in the science
of alchemy, 3 the symbolic significance of the Phoenix and, of course,
Christianity, all of which describe a transformational process involving
destruction of one material form in order to enable reincarnation or
resurrection in another form.'
4
Bodies of Law presents three theses as to why the law (and lawyers, as
wordsmiths) are particularly good at constructing bodies and then treat-
ing the constructions as though they are the people they represent (a
variation on the theme of worshipping graven images, one supposes).
First, as employed in contemporary American law, body means an incon-
sistent and incoherent assortment of representations and visualizations,
deployed to solve political problems internal to legal discourse. Second,
there is no attractive alternative to this practice of representation. In
particular, there is no "real" or "material" body that is available as a
standard for political or legal theory, even when the precise question to be
answered involves defining the boundaries of, or intrusion into, or use of,
that body. We have literally no way of grasping cognitively the most
intimate aspects of our bodies except through words and images of legal,
that is, political discourse, developed to serve political purposes. Third,




13. Stanislas Klossowski De Rola, The Secret Art of Alchemy (London: Thames & Hudson,
1973).
14. The universality and significance of these patterns of shared human experience have been
studied extensively by many, most notably C. Jung, Man & His Symbols (New York: Dell
Publishing, 1975); M. Eliade,Images & Symbols: Studies in Religious Symbolism. (New York:
Sheed & Ward, 1969).
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representations of the body, and not, as they often do, inappropriately
naturalize those constructions. Such inappropriate naturalizations of what
are really discursive artifacts include the localizing in the body of such
apparently natural or objective factors as race, sex, and disease. 5
The author also employs a tripartite division or trinity in the organiza-
tional structure of the book to advance these three theses and his project
(the destruction and reincarnation of the body). Bodies of Law is com-
prised of three parts entitled, Regulation, Desire and Abjection, respec-
tively.
Part ],Regulation, examines American case law which treats the body
as a machine, a tired machine, property, private property (no trespassers)
and unsaleable (reproductive capacity) but commodified. These cases
reflect the somewhat overlapping and incoherent development of legal
thinking about human bodies-largely in relation to the limits of state or
social interests in touching bodies. Clearly, and as the author's analysis
illustrates, it is a complex topic and perhaps a confused jurisprudence. If
our bodies are private property why can't we sell them? Why does Anglo-
American law allow the sale of the products of our brain but does not
condone the sale of our reproductive functions, except by agreed upon
liability provisions for workplace harms? Why can we sell or rent the use
of legs, hands and feet in labour services but the sale or rental of genital
services is less acceptable? Why are all these physical activities charac-
terized as analogous to commercial or property transactions? These are
not new questions, particularly for readers who have followed the case
law regarding the legal regulation of women's bodies, and a collection of
these sorts of cases does serve to highlight the extent to which the male
dominated world of law remains absurdly removed from human experi-
ence. Further examples could be given that the author did not consider-
such as the failure, until recently, to see feelings and emotions such as
shame as a human experience which could be legally recognized. These
"metaphysical" experiences remain largely unrecognized in many situa-
tions unless coupled with the loss or harm to limbs and organs or other
recognized physical experiences.
Part Iends with a plea for a constitutional jurisprudence based on how
we want to live with each other. Instead of the "cold" economic and
industrial "metaphors" for the body as isolated bearers of rights described
in terms of the body as machine or property or privacy, Hyde asks: "[clan
we conceptualize people as people in relations?" "Can we create a bodily
discourse of pleasure, of sexuality?" "What about a better vocabulary of
15. at4.
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domination, particularly gender domination?" 16 While these questions
are provocative, Alan Hyde does not provide any examples or an
explanation of what this new jurisprudence would look like or what
difference it would make. For example, developing a better vocabulary
of domination seems a somewhat less than useful exercise. If what he is
suggesting is a more accurate description of the power relationships in the
workplace wherein people do "sell" body parts and, arguably, their
person in the form of labour or exposure to workplace risks, it might make
some sense, at least superficially. However this approach assumes that
relabelling these events will cause such horror that the reality will change.
The danger is that in fact it will not, and we will live in a society that
explicitly condones the sale or rent of self or people.
Part H, Desire, deals with the body as a product, an investment and a
part of the economic system. Alan Hyde uses "desire as a non-technical
term to cover all relations in which someone wants to see, be close to,
understand, possess the body of another but that are not characteristically
experienced as relations of economic exchange."' 7 In this analysis he
turns to Freud and Lacan's theories of erotic and infantile attractions and
the notion that we gain a sense of self through the mirror of others.1
8
"Specularization" in various forms is the rather obscure word Alan Hyde
uses to describe this experience. He argues that the "task of legal
discourse is to displace the erotic desire to know the displayed body." 19
It does this by regulating what parts of people can be displayed and where
and who may view these displayed bodies. Not surprisingly, many of the
cases he reviews illustrate the fact that women's bodies are more
frequently accepted and regulated for purposes of economic display, e.g.,
the 1987 case of Tamimi v. Howard Johnson Co. Inc., ° regarding a
woman employee required to wear makeup in order to "market" rooms
at a hotel desk, presumably on the theory that the consumer implicitly
associates the room/bed with the attractive but unavailable women who
sells it to him (or, I suppose, her, although marketing practices still reflect
heterosexual assumptions). The notion of subliminal seduction and its
linkage to sex and women has been around for a long time. The discussion
is interesting, not so much because Hyde tells us anything particularly
new, but because the author, in collecting these cases, highlights the
16. at 105.
17. at 109.
18. Although he expressly rejects an alliance with any particular school of psychotherapy,
at 110.
19. at 110.
20. Tamimi v. Howard Johnson Co. Inc., 807 F. 2d, 1554 (1 lth Cir. 1987), Hyde at 117-120.
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absurdity of the law's attempt to develop rationales and reconcile
precedents while refusing to recognize sexuality or patriarchy and the
linkages between the two in our economic system.
In Part II Alan Hyde wanders into art, semiotics, communications and
feminist analysis, although he gives rather short shift to Catharine
MacKinnon and Andrea Dworkin. In the latter case it is especially
surprising because her 1987 book Intercourse2 examines much of the
same ground as Bodies of Law, although she collects, classifies and
deconstructs literature to make her point regarding the inevitability of
physical (and other) domination and objectification of women by men in
a society founded on domination and hatred of women. In both Hyde and
Dworkin it seems that love and sense of the self and dehumanization of
others are inextricably linked.
Alan Hyde extends his analysis of "desired bodies" to include bodies
which contain legal "stories" or evidence such as bullets and drugs, and
the limits on search and seizure and bodily intrusion. The examples he
uses, such as a criminal law case involving a request for a search warrant
for a woman's vagina" and another concerning testing of the reactions of
a man's penis in a civil case23 (the searchable vagina and the unsearchable
penis), make the point that the law does not approach consistently the
question of searching bodies for evidence in a legal story. The author
concedes that to some extent he is mixing apples and oranges in that while
the outcomes of these two cases superficially appear contradictory,in fact
the analysis and context (criminal and civil) call for different balancing
processes regarding privacy and the public interests involved. This may
well undermine his argument from a legal perspective but it does raise an
important point-why should the approach be any different to bodily
intrusion? Hyde deplores rationales based on a public interest outweigh-
ing privacy rights because, in his view, the law is not considering any real
body but only the legally constructed body in determining these bound-
aries. Judges do not relate their decisions to their own bodily experiences
and sense of boundaries, he argues. 24 In his view there is no "convincing
metatheory" of the body and the best that the law can do is to try to develop
some coherency in its approach to balancing the reasons for setting bodily
boundaries." Although these are good points, Hyde does not really
21. A. Dworkin, Intercourse (New York: Free Press, 1987).
22. Rodriques v. Furtado, 950 F.2d 805, (1st Circ. 1991).




explore the meaning of tort law regarding assault and the question of
human rights restrictions on workplace testing and discrimination. Some-
what surprisingly, the author also recognizes but then deliberately dis-
misses what appears to be the most obvious explanation of the outcomes
in these two cases-gender-as he comments "I do not think it is
necessary to belabour the sexual difference here. Much has been written,
particularly in the Freudian and Lacanian traditions about the symbolic
significance of the penis .... "26
Part II on desire concludes by examining the emergence of "the
sentimental body" - that is, the body as a site of uniqueness, feeling,
commonality and empathy. His study focuses on the changes in the law
regarding the treatment of prisoners and the fact that law can create both
a prison and a protection for the body/person.
Bodies ofLaw's third and final Part, in which the Alan Hyde's phoenix,
the "Body Fantasia" emerges, adopts as its title and theme "Abjection."
Abjection is the theoretical framework used by the author to explore the
law's treatment of bodily surplus, wastes, excrement and rejection. His
analysis expressly draws on ("appropriated" is the author's term) the
concept of abjection developed by a psychoanalyst, Julia Kristeva, in her
book Powers of Horror: An Essay on Abjection.27
Abjection is described as dealing with the infantile experience of the
self prior to the mirroring experience described by Freud and Lacan, e.g.,
where a child is presymbolic in her or his development. According to
Alan Hyde, abjection "is the opposite of desire . . . [It] begins in the
experience of excess or surplus, which must be got rid of. Both, however,
are sources of intense pleasure, as everyone knows ... though the literary
and artistic representations of the pleasure of abjections are rare and the
opposite of elevating. "28
Hyde links this theory to an analysis of legal cases dealing with urine
analysis and various other evaluations of human excrement that contains
"narratives" of interest to the law, e.g., evidence of drug use. This analysis
is stretched include to border or customs guards who are seen as taking
on the role of purification of the social body-keeping the unwanted out.
He considers several cases in terms of the racialized body as an abjected
body -that is a rejected or different body.
26. at 179.
27. Julia Kristeva, Powers of Horror: An Essay on Abjection, trans. Leon S. Roudiez (New
York: Columbia University Press, 1982), Hyde at 211. It may be useful to note that Hyde
describes her writing as "difficult, prolix and obscure."
28. at 212.
258 The Dalhousie Law Journal
The remainder of Part III, aside from the conclusion, examines
diseased bodies, the rise of bathing and the association of smelly or
"offensive" bodies with poverty. To a large extent Part III is a meander
through the history of the senses and changing social ideas and practices.
The conclusion of Part III sees the emergence of the new "discursive
embodied person." "A Body Fantasia," as the title of the concluding
chapter announces. In "A Body Fantasia," Alan Hyde ends the
deconstruction process and shifts to reconstruction and, finally, reincar-
nation. He proposes a number of other ways in which the law might more
coherently construct the human body to recognize it more clearly as an
aspect of personhood. For example he suggests that the law might instead:
Construct bodies as the nexus of all the relationships of their lives,
meaningless and insignificant except as the sum of those relationships
Equate legal subjects with their bodies, so that sale of blood or labour
power could only be experienced as a sale of the person
Construct bodies as always presumptively available to social use
Construct bodies that differentiated each subject from another in ways that
were entirely incommensurable, so that no body damage could even be
evaluated
Construct bodies that could never represent any social relationship but
sameness, so that differences among people, to the limited extent they
were even observed, would be attributed entirely to their mental or moral
processes, and not to bodies that were incapable of requiring such differ-
ence, at most capable of providing a certain normal variation that became
difference only as self-consciously constructed as such
Always and everywhere treat "body" as a legal construction like "due
care" or "good faith", a legal term of art used to facilitate our making
present other people, but always understood as a conscious creation
employed for that (or some other) purpose, not a natural thing existing
independent of our constructions. On this view we might write or say
whatever we pleased about the body but would always be aware that we
were reaching for figurative language and never be deluded into thinking
we were describing reality
Make a very self-conscious effort never to employ our body metaphors of
distance or absence, never to forget that legal subjects have bodies, strive
for a law and politics of embodied subjects and always employ the most
vivid literary imaging of bodies lest we forget that law is about people and
people inter-act in the world through the media of their bodies. 29
While the intent of this list of alternate views is to provide a more
holistic approach and result in a convergence of the physical and spiritual
aspect of personhood, it fails to do so. Rather it appears instead to
29. edited list, at 261-262.
Corpor- (r)eality
entrench current practices and abstractions. In some cases it also seems
regressive. For example, it appears to condone the notion of the sale of a
person if, for example, we choose to sell our physical labour for money.
Perhaps the disparity of power in some employment relationships is such
that it does amount to slavery, however the difficulty his suggestion
presents is obvious. As mentioned earlier, altering the language used to
describe events to explicitly recognize the sale of bodily activities as the
sale of a person may not have the positive effect he imagines. In the area
of tort law compensation for injury do we really want to regard the
payment for specific injuries as payment for a person? In another context
do we wish to regard compensation payments to survivors of sexual abuse
in institutions as buying the person's experience? If so, will this mean that
we value people differently if the amount differs between people or does
it means we never compensate people who suffer an injury? It appears
that the latter is his suggestion. The result will be the height of academic
disconnection with people's experience: in order to ensure a consistent
academic theory of respect for the person we will not financially assist
people who suffer a harm. It is clear that money will not pay for the harms
inflicted, at best it constitutes an admission of responsibility, if not
liability, and an attempt to perhaps improve the person's situation in the
future.
Alan Hyde explains that his choice of the term, "Fantasia," to describe
this "alternative" constructive "discourse" of the body draws on its
romantic and archaic meaning of "image-production"30 (as opposed to the
Disney feature film). "In body fantasia, the most important goal in any
sort of legal analysis is communion with another person."31 In this
fantastic world we will acknowledge that bodies are but "visualizations"
which have no rights because they are not legal entities but, rather, are
"the site of pleasure, sexuality and fusion with others."32 He suggests that,
"[i]f fantasia and empathy were an announced goal of the legal system,
judges would be praised or criticized for their achievements in fantasia."33
And so, the reader imagines the Phoenix rises and takes wing ...
Earlier I set out the author's three aspirations and it seems fair to
consider his work on these terms, having already suggested it clearly did
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Bodies of Law is indeed a collection of some American case law
describing human bodies in various ways. It is not comprehensive but the
selections are by and large interesting. Certainly the author manages
through the juxtaposition of cases, often drawn from differing areas of
legal practice, to establish that the law's dealings with the body are
inconsistent (if explicable) and incoherent and that they reflect the notion
of a person as somehow different (in some cases) from his or her body.
His sources are indeed eclectic and, if for that reason only, the book may
be worth acquiring. While it was interesting to see the explicit reach for
inclusion of psychological theories of human behaviour in legal analysis,
the ideas he presents are yesterday's news dressed up in a new language.
It is heartening to see Hyde's receptivity to ideas about the significance
of the relationship between our physical and our metaphysical selves, but
these ideas have been common knowledge amongst religious thinkers,
philosophers, feminists and yoga practitioners and others for a long time,
and are a central component of complementary health practices. The
more current issue is not denying physical existence but rather trying to
understand the silenced language of our bodies (called somatic
psychology) .
Does Bodies of Law serve to open up a dialogue free of jargon? As I
have noted earlier, it is still littered with obscure terminology. The style
in which the book is written does not invite avid attention, rather, it is a
hard slog to stick with Bodies of Law. One is not well rewarded for this
effort because Hyde's conclusions are ornate but lacking in substance. He
does not provide any examples to assist in understanding his vision. There
is no sense of emerging from Bodies ofLaw learning anything particularly
new about the law, aside from a few terms and theories used in disciplines
other than law.
Does Alan Hyde manage to provide an affirmative jurisprudential
statement on the human person from the CLS network? It is a trifle
difficult to comment fairly on that last point since it appears to be co-
opting a large number of scholars. Does he manage to construct an
affirmative, holistic and ethically consistent jurisprudence of the human
person? Alan Hyde sought through this book to reintegrate or heal the
mind/body split through the deconstruction of the socially constructed
body. Instead he ends up with a deconstructed body but still no integration
of the physical and metaphysical. His list of proposed alternative con-
34. L. Kirmayer, "The Body's Insistence on Meaning: Metaphor as Presentation and
Representation in Illness Experience" (1992) 6 Med. Anthro. Q. 323; C. Caldwell, Getting our
Bodies Back (Boston & London: Shambahala, 1996).
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structions appear to be more a reworking of clumsy and rather intractable
ideas: despite his claims to romanticism and fantasia they do not "fly."
While his "post-modern" aim of reconstruction is laudable it is simply
part of the zeitgeist and the revulsion for the spiritual deadend of
deconstruction. The "romantically" reconstructed body presented in
Bodies of Law is not warm or breathing, it is an abstraction and remains
purely a creation of the intellect. It brings to mind the words of Oscar
Wilde, "All thought is immoral. Its very essence is destruction. If you
think of anything you kill it. Nothing survives being thought of."35
I was also disappointed that, in exploring the law's bodily fictions,
Alan Hyde did not look at what is surely one of the more interesting legal
constructions -the purely legal body of the corporation. As a holder of
rights with parents and sisters and relationships of all sorts, it is in fact the
most powerful legal body today. It is virtual, often stateless, faceless, non-
sexual and only partially gendered.36 It is the ultimate legal body: it is pure
construction. The fact that it is the result of a legal construction process
opposite to the one described by Alan Hyde makes it even more interest-
ing. Unlike the law's dehumanization of human bodies the corporation is
an example of the humanizing of a legal entity.
While I recognize it is rather unfair to criticize an author for not
including other information or sources, it is unfortunate that in his
embrace of eclecticism he missed considering the earlier jurisprudential
work, particularly in Eastern Europe, of sociologists of law who exam-
ined the visceral or bodily experience of law or justice. One scholar in
particular, Leon Petrazycki ,17 writing in the early 1900s, and his followers
developed a psychological theory to explain the human physical and
emotional experience of law. The idea has also been explored by
American writers such as Edmond Cahn.38 These writers sought also to
combine psychology, law and sociology with the human experience of
feelings about law and legitimacy and thus provide an entirely different
approach to the integration of the body, mind and community in the
context of law.
35. Oscar Wilde, Epigrams (White Plains, NY: Peter Pauper Press, n.d.) at 30.
36. One of the oddities in the law is that related corporations are often described as sister
corporations and parent corporations but we do not seem to have brother corporations. Thus
we have a partial reproduction of the traditional family structure.
37. L. Petrazycki, Law and Morality, trans. H.W. Babb (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard Univer-
sity Press, 1955).
38. The Sense of Injustice (New York: New York University Press, 1949).
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It is not difficult to agree with Alan Hyde's point about existing in a hall
of mirrors and our resultant inability to truly see or know ourselves
outside of these representations. Nevertheless, we do exist and feel and
laugh and cry and bleed. Somehow the meaning of this experience gets
lost in the rather tiring hyperbole and artifice of Bodies of Law.
